



From Volume to Value: New Payment Models to Incentivize Quality

Kansas Foundation for Medical Care

Quality Forum

June 6, 2013





It's All About Money

Medicare annual spend

- **2010**: \$525B (15% federal spending)

- 2020: \$922B

Medicaid annual spend

- **2010**: \$401B (\$271B federal/\$130B state) (8% federal spending)

- **2020**: \$908B (\$561B federal/\$347B state)

Total annual spend

- 2010: \$2.64 trillion; 17.6% of GDP; \$8,327 per capita

- **2020**: \$4.64 trillion; 19.8 % of GDP; \$13,708 per capita





First Law of Improvement

Every system is perfectly designed to achieve exactly the results it gets









Volume-Based Reimbursement

- Reward providers for delivering more care
 - Not more health
 - Not high quality care
- Regulate providers to prevent overutilization and control costs









Foundational Change

Today


- Provide more services
- Medical necessity as regulator
- Cost is a function of charges

Tomorrow

- Protocol drives what and when services are provided
- Quality measures as regulators
- Tracking and reducing costs is critical







Payments Based on Quality Four Tactics

- Hospital readmission reduction program
- 2. Hospital value-based purchasing
- 3. Physician quality incentives/penalties
- 4. Physician value-based purchasing








Hospital Readmission Reduction Program

- Penalty based on 3-year historical 30-day hospital readmission rates for AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia
 - Same or any other subsection (d) hospital
 - Reason for readmission irrelevant
 - List expands in 2015 to include hip/knee arthroplasty and COPD







Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

- Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
 - Hospital IQR Program
 - Report on quality measures to avoid 2% cut in payment updates
 - 90% participation
- American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009
 - Meaningful use incentive payments (quality reporting)
- Affordable Care Act of 2010
 - DRG modifier
 - HAC/never event penalty






DRG Modifier

- Adjustment to DRG payment based on clinical quality measures and patient satisfaction scores
 - Achievement and improvement
 - Budget neutral (winners and losers)
 - Percentage of DRG payments at risk (withhold and re-distribute)
 - 1.25% for FY2014







HAC/Never Event Penalty

- Begins in FY2015
- Top quartile will have payments reduced by 1 percent





Measures


- Proposed "never events"
 - Pressure ulcer rate
 - Volume of foreign object left in the body
 - Latrogenic pneumothorax rate
 - Postoperative physiologic and metabolic derangement rate
 - Postoperative pulmonary embolism or DVT rate
 - Accidental puncture and laceration rate
- Proposed HACs
 - Central line-associated blood stream infection
 - Catheter-associated UTI





Rock and a Hard Spot?

- JAMA: Surgical Complications and Hospital Finances
 - Analyzed data from 10-hospital system in southern US
 - Surgical complications = higher hospital contribution margins (except for Medicaid and self-pay)
 - Substantial adverse near-term financial consequences of reducing overall complication rate







Physician Quality Incentives

- Physician Quality Reporting System
 - Submission of reports, not achievement of scores
 - Range of reporting options
 - Carrots followed by sticks
 - 0.5% bonus in 2013 and 2014
 - 1.5% *penalty* in 2015 if ≠ report in 2013
 - 2.0% *penalty* in 2016 ≠ report in 2014 (and thereafter)
 - Meaningful use penalties
 - 1% penalty in 2015 if not MU in 2014; 2% in 2016; 3% in 2017; 4% in 2018 or 2019





Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier

- Phased in between 2015 and 2017
- 2013 performance determines 2015 modifier for providers in groups of 100+
- Budget neutral (winners and losers)
- wRVU x conversion factor x VBPM
 - Positive number = paid more
 - Negative number = paid less
- Far broader impact than Medicare payment







Physician Feedback Reports

- Individual reports on resource use and quality of care as compared to peer group based on Medicare data
- Used to calculate Medicare physician value-based payment modifier
- Schedule
 - By April 2013, reports to physicians in groups of 25+ in nine states based on 2011 data (CA, IL, WI, MN, MI, MO, IA, KS, NE)
 - By February 2014, reports to physicians in groups of 25+ nationwide based on 2012 data
 - All physicians by 2016






SGR Fix

- Formula used to calculate Medicare physician payment rates
- CBO estimates cost at \$138 billion
- Proposal under serious discussion
 - Phase 1: Stable payment rates for specified period; medical specialties develop cost and efficiency measures
 - Phase 2: Payment adjustments based on quality
 - Phase 3: Payment adjustments based on efficiencies








Clinical Integration

- Providers accountable to each other and to community to deliver high quality care in efficient manner
 - Collectively define and enforce standards of care
 - Coordinate patient care







Rewards for Clinical Integration Three Tactics

- 1. FFS Payment for Care Management
- 2. Accountable Care Organizations
- 3. Bundled Payments







FFS Payment for Care Management

- New Medicare payment for post-discharge transitional care management
- Key elements
 - Contact within 2 days of discharge
 - Face-to-face visit within 7 (or 14) days
 - Non-face-to-face care management services over 30-day period
- Chronic care management payments in CY2014?





Accountable Care Organizations

- Elliott Fisher's 2006 MedPAC presentation
 - Higher spending regions experience lower quality and satisfaction
 - Differences in spending = supply sensitive services
 - "No one is accountable for local capacity and political culture."
 - Create 5,000 extended hospital medical staffs accountable for care for defined population
 - o Payment adjustments based on performance measurements







Accountable Care Economics

- Begin shifting risk from payer to provider
- ACO is risk management vehicle
- ACO risk = total FFS payments benchmark
 - Held accountable for quality of care by performance standards
- HMO risk = provider cost capitated payment





Calculating Shared Savings/Losses

- Each ACO participant continues to bill fee-for-service independently
- Eligibility for and level of shared savings based on performance score
- Calculate actual total cost of care for assigned patients against pre-determined benchmark
- Apply formula to determine share of savings (losses)







Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO Functions

- Establish and maintain quality assurance and improvement program
- Promote evidence-based medicine, patient engagement, care coordination, patient-centeredness
- Compile and report participants' quality measure scores
- Distribute shared savings and assess shared losses









Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Program

CMS Innovation Center pilot project to test bundling methodology

48 targeted episodes – about half are surgical procedures

Retrospective and prospective payment



VISION BEYOND

Commercial Payers

- Blue Cross Blue Shield of TN ortho bundle
- Walmart bundled payments for spine and cardiac procedures
 - Exclusive to six "Centers of Excellence"
 - No-cost medical tourism for employees
- Cleveland Clinic's cardiac bundles with Boeing and Lowe's
- Carolina HealthCare cardiac bundles for private pay, local employers



VISION BEYOND the Numbers

8 Steps to Bundled Payments



Define episodes of care



Examine distribution of costs across services

Identify sources of variation in care and costs



Design pathways of care



Assess performance of post-acute care providers



Examine physician practice patterns to identify potential savings



Assess levels/types of risk hospital is willing to assume









Thank You!

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This presentation is for general informational purposes only.

Please consult with a qualified advisor with regard to the application in specific circumstances of the information discussed herein.



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